>> good afternoon. mi on. -- am i on? >> how are you? you look good. >> good afternoon, everyone. i know we are pulling people back from our coffee break, but we are delighted to get started here. good afternoon. my name is heather conley, senior vice president here at csis, and matt, who has been my partner in crime, to talk about four years of sanctions, you just heard of a really rich about the impact on sanctions on the u.s. economy, we're going to turn to the impact of sanctions on russia's foreign policy, and i could not think of to better people to help us understand what those implications are than with me here today, i will begin on my immediate left with the

senior adviser and director of russia and eurasia program here at csis. afore she joined us, she was long serving specialist at the rand corporation, and she held a series of incredible books and russialy articles about foreign policy, and also, we have a united states special representative for ukraine with the state department, and he is the executive director of the mccain institute for international leadership at arizona state university. for hisyou know kurt long service as a distinguished foreign service officer, expanding to nato, the national security council, and deputy undersecretary in the european bureau. we are delighted that both of

you could join us. i thought we would jump on and with some questions. in with some questions. panelf the penultimate of discussions -- four years of sanctions. let me begin with you -- what has been the impact on russian foreign policy? i would like to dive a little deeper into that from your perspective as a negotiator for the ukraine issues in this agreement. have you seen any impact that sanctions have had on russia via policy behavior, specifically with ukraine? kurt: yes and no. if you are looking did russia change its mind and withdrawal from ukraine to get crimea back? it did not have that kind of dramatic impact. on the other hand, i think it has a significant impact in the day-to-day way in which russia , particularlyk

thinking about the european union, but more broadly as well. let me give you this example. arell -- nerve agent attack in the u.k.. there, is that shortly before his reelection in order to send a signal. i would argue that it was a signal aimed at people in russia, that i am now officially entering my fourth term and not eligible to run for president anymore. but do not count me out. i am still in charge and willing to do what ever it takes for russia. that is a tough message from putin. why did he have to do that? waswas it necessary -- why

a message like that necessary to send? inside the system there is some grumbling. business,sing out on travel, our assets are at risk and we do not see our families. it pressure on the system. ofn you look at the amount energy that russia invests at trying to divide the european union, whether it is picking off individual e.u. countries that may be interested in reviving a business relationship, they put a lot of effort into this. why? able to divide europe as a strategic objective and resume some of those business relationships with countries. while it has not caused a. gail -- while it has not caused a full-scale withdrawal, it has caused an impact.

i would argue that it is an important tool and one that should be increasingly added to because, if it is static, people can get used to it. if you think that it will be lifted you could wait it out. if you are demonstrating that you are adding a little bit and prepared to keep going, it presents a clear, united message of a broader community -- and that unity is important. we also send a signal that it will not get better, it will get worse. that is the most important thing to do to build the basis of change over time. heather: what do you believe the impact has been over the past four years? russia has intervened militarily in the syria and continue to see domestic interference in france montanegigne a grow --

ro in other areas heard what is the impact? important to's unpack the sanctions. notcrimea sanctions were intended to have a lot of impact. on thections imposed military involvement in ukraine, those do have an impact. those are the ones that send the signal of unities. they surprised the russian -- basic prized the right -- they surprised the russians. i think they sent a real signal that the international community is not going to accept best -- this. they have a very clear exit pass. you change this policy, they go away. thing ton important

break off. -- it didons imposed not stop the russians from doing other foreign-policy activities. this is important for the next piece of this. we now have sanctions that are linked to interference and a new set of sanctions that are linked to russia being russia. it is syria, ukraine, more ripal.erence, it is sk russians, individual russians, and firms. this perception in russia is that the sanctions are forever and there is not an exit path. believe that these new us to sanctions will not be lifted.

the prussianeeping on by escalation is not a smart move and less you make it clear -- this is why keeping the pressure on by escalation is not a smart move. is,e russia approaches this they will keep up the pressure and we will counter with no pressure. there is no way out of this so why would we look for mechanisms? the challenge for me is that she sanctions -- is that sanctions are tools to shape and over arcing policy. we are starting to get tangled up in what we should accomplish. this is getting tangled up in other behavior, providing aid to the atoll a bond -- to the taliban or whatever. what is the overarching policy

framework? , as useep applying them adjusted kurt, what is the policy framework -- as it used suggested kurt, what is the policy framework? relatede minsk sanctions are different from the other sanctions. withdrawal --to withdraw we would be lifting those sanctions. not all of them and the russians know that. the crimea ones have less bite. the minsk one's a bit more. there is incentive to solve that one. that is the answer to your questions. to get a specific policy change.

there are other things we are doing to facilitate a resolution of the conflict in eastern ukraine. such as lifting the ban of arms sales to the ukrainians. areing that the costs extensive, sanctions are a part of that but it is also part of a lack of relationship, cost of military operations, cost of that are happening there. there is a high cost and not much gain. together with that, the sanctions fit in with that. reason is the degree of response or punishment. take crimea. i do not think anyone who thinks that the sanctions there will cause russia to give up crimea

right away. --want to have them there as because taking territory is simply not acceptable, and we will not agree to that this time. serves as a bit of a deterrent next time, do not do this because you will see a response. thes a combination, and in words of other policy options, these are ones that are the most palatable. presumably we take the russian government at its word, they will never return crimea to ukraine. ergo, though sanctions will be perpetual unless it is turned back. is that correct? we will says where one thing and they will say another, and we will see what will happen over time.

occupiedc states were for a longtime, and e been chu a lead that change. -- and even eventually that changed. look in great admiration at our predecessors in foreign policy. heather: they will never get out from the sanctions, there will always be something. in crimea area -- in crimea they may be perpetual. crimeannot mind the ones as much. but there is some sense that any --lifting sanctions be lift beat linked to crimea. to keep a goal is heavy set of sanctions and --

that cannot be lifted. maintain the stand off between the united states and the west behind it and russia. i do not know how sustainable it could be, it is obviously not u.s. policy. be extent to which it can pushed and the russians believe it is u.s. policy, that creates a stand off. in signaling on this one is -- is important. my -- if i may glean some experts off of potent speech today, it still has threats but it is secure. the regime will focus on the

internal dynamic. anyou think there is acceptance that this is the status quo, that the regime does not anticipate lifting sanctions and it feels ok where it is an managing through those sanctions? olga: they do not expect sanctions to be lifted. interestbe in russia's to make progress in minsk and the ukraine. one could argue that if we continue to escalate sanctions, we create a different pattern for them to do this. theyagain, it is not like have made any progress in the last few years. i do think it closes the space. they are not going to make progress after another set of sanctions imposed. -- is imposed. that is a problem. their expectation is that they

will face continued and graduated sanctions and they will hold firm. this has been been a facial -- beneficial to put in. took 10.-- -- to putin. there are sanctions, he can say the reason you are having trouble and your salary has been cut, the reason that your mom cannot afford food is because of the americans. it is their fault. heather: it gives them that justification. now withas wondering, the build to the russian election, do you think you will see changes towards the net -- the ukraine negotiations.

before the elections there was the offer of potentially peacekeeping operations. years, is there more room for foreign policy engagements? , evenwe put in place before we really ran into the election. -- even before we ran into the we hadn period, sanctions in place and the prospect of increasing them and the support for ukraine's defense capabilities. we were pushing ukraine on reform and trying to demonstrate that russia will not get any more out of this conflict. we have all of that lined up and rateso all for -- offer a -- a way forward. the midst -- the minsk

agreements are on the table. a just need to be mandated. they just need to allow them to be implemented. all of that is on the table. it comes down to, what does russia want to do. doesn't want peace or continue to conflict. want peace or continue the conflict? so far, it shows that it wants to continue the conflict. the context is bad. that, with ukraine going into elections it may be a bit of a wait and see. i am not confident that russia is going to do much different than it has been doing.

i think we are positioned the right way to continue to put pressure for resolution and be prepared to execute a resolution. crimea, sanctions stay. ukraine, stay in till the ukrainian elections. let me take a step back. packagethe sanctions has been focused on military defense industry and it is a significant moneymaker. it has started to challenge nato partners like turkey. you have to understand, you are a close observer of russian military strength. let us look at the defense budget and what does this mean for other countries as russia get very specific weaponry. aga: whether you look at

jets, expenditures, you can run the numbers a couple of different way -- whether you , expenditures, you can run the numbers a couple of different ways. the budget is holding. sanctions are not hurting defense. arms sales are an interesting additional wrinkle. biggests the second arms dealer in the world after the united states. theymake a lot of money, sell weapons to a lot of people who do not want to find new suppliers. the united states is not a good alternative. there are not a lot of good alternatives. the sanction language is worded vaguely. hard time believing that the united states is going

to go after india for buying most of its weapons from russia. the turks have made it clear it that they will do what ever they please. might be a- this dangerous move because the united states does not have the bite it wants to have. heather: how do you see military moderate -- military modernization? we are waiting to see how the sale ofs with the u.s. defensive weapons to ukraine. does that cause concern? kurt: two things. one of them is the impact on allies. a number of them continue to have former soviet equipment in their inventories.

they continue to rely on access to that. 20 -- it has been 21 years since the first countries joined nato. and then 15 or 16 years since the next stretch. that is along time for countries not to be investing in modernizing their systems. on the ukrainian side, the balance of forces is extraordinarily clear. more military capabilities in eastern ukraine and surrounding ukraine then ukraine ever will have. it is not a question of emboldening do ukrainians to attack, neither one of those is a rational look at the

situation. what this does is it puts in place a potentially greater cost expandia, if it once to its control of the ukrainian territory. if it wants to take more, there public,more visible, and costly to russia than previously. , therefore, probably not doing. that is on top of russia not wanting to do that right now anyway. of furthererrence aggression. it is adding into the prospect of them not getting anything further out of it, so they will resolve it. isther: not that consistency our strong suit, there were no sanctions or punishment over georgia.

another matter it remains thesolved although government has asked for a withdrawal of russian peacekeepers from the country. moldova, sot in give us the scene. how does this impact the neighborhood as we are watching continued military exercises and an increase in exercises? aboutoes this tell us russian behavior? olga: the russians believe they have a zone of privileged interests. they want the new security deal that they want to negotiate. -- officiallytes with nato, but they want to negotiate with the united states.

it is meant to cement that. that has not changed. sends thataine signal to other countries that on thell take action, part of the united states and the european countries, we have sent the signal that so far but not further. it is a useful signal, but there are questions that have not been answered about how to secure europe. it is worth having a conversation, because this is an impasse. they are not deterred from going in if they think they need to. -- if they decide that is what they need to do for any security goals they perceive, they are going to do it. that has not changed. ofther: you have done a lot

work in georgia, and have had an ongoing dialogue with many of the regional leaders. what is the outlook for the regent? region?he kurt: in georgia that we did not impose any sanctions. we had a limited effort to push for the negotiation of a cease-fire. once that was in place we dropped anything after that, for a variety of reasons. president obama wanted to be the opposite of president bush. we did the reset, and we did not get anywhere. didddition to that, russia not immediately recognize the independence of these entities. asjust viewed them territories. it certainly did not annex them. i would argue that we

are an exception -- we are annexation light. kurt: it is important. -- it is continued occupation but annexation. crimea, i think the russians thought that the west would to the way thely rest did not respond after georgia. annexation turned out to be a different thing. a legal and political threshold for europe that georgia did not. triggered the first phase of sanctions and pushed back a lack of relationship with the e.u. and nato that six years restoredsident obama

the russian council, they suspended it again. that was viewed in russia as a weak response. even though it was something it was relatively weak, which led to what happens in eastern ukraine. i think it took that before the west could really respond in eight more concerted manner. since then russia has not recognized the independence of republics thats it created because i do not think they want to be saddled with the consequences. they do not want the territory. not taken further steps towards legal annexation or recognition of independence the odd what they have already done. done creeping things such as integrating the armed forces and putting the russian border guards on the internal border. they have not done it as a legal

matter. now, with of the response from the u.s. and the e.u. together, the costs are higher from russia to think about doing it again. heather: when the supreme allied commander in europe testified a month or so to congress he was asked where was he worried about russia. said, i am worried about the western balkans of a potential area of russian influence. everything we talked about, ofctions, deterrence, a lot economic and military support. serbia and else where you can see a scenario as serbia moves e.u. -- if we -- have not deterred fully, where

is the logical place where russia would think about challenging the west, but at local -- but at low cost? balkans and hungry, and turkey is challenging at very low cost. west and ther the united states and nato are not sure of their interest, there is room for russia. a valid question to ask is how interested are we at fighting the russians? the russians see a change in global order. my guess is that they are right. the russians are trying to grab at what they can before it solidifies into what ever the new form is. the turks are playing that game as well. they are trying to figure out what is possible.

most of this is not military, and of it is economics everything else. if we want to make it an arm wrestling match, that is a lot of investment, energy and effort and we do not know how to do this. they do not know how to do this either and these countries will make their own decisions based on how they look at their options. order to shape argumente, there is an for having some conversations amongst yourselves about what priorities are and, potentially with these countries, once we have defined our own red lines, to make them clear. are the what do you see future challenges if we are not deterring russian behavior with sanctions? western balkans, i

agree that is an area of concern. it is an area of concern because anis an on -- it is unresolved set of conflicts and one that the e.u. and nato has not stepped in to say this is a part of europe and it will be secure and so on. it is a bit of a gray zone. that is an opportunity. that you have constituencies that are unhappy, they look to russia as an alternative. that is an opportunity for russia to work with those constituencies. true among nato anti-e.u. companies where we have done a good job of building constituencies -- that is true among nato and e.u. countries where we have done a good job of building constituencies. they have no real affinity for being part of russia, they want to be part of the baltic states. you have heard of -- we look at

education in estonia. is not that the russian speaking community is not want their kids to learn estonian, the issue is there are not enough teachers to teach them estonian. they desperately want to be integrating that in society. it is in the gray area where we have not had outward looking locus. we have been very much treading water and afraid to think about assequences of putting in -- too difficult, too complicated and do we want to do it again. i hope that can change but i think that is currently the state of play. russia has already put down markers in georgia and ukraine. what may move outside

of europe and go into the middle east and syria. i know you have been watching this space carefully. russia, a concern that helping,g oil prices, to the point of overextension where russia is -- russia's footprint in, trying to grow it out. or canat start to bite he manage what they've got so far? olga: what russia has exhibited over the last few years is a surprisingly low bar for the use of force but very judicious use of that force. these are not huge commitments. these are comparatively small commitments. it was tough in syria, getting keeping sorted out, but

it there is not going to break russia. if we do get to a point where the risen and game, the russian ideal is that they cut a deal where they are in control of some things and the americans are in place in other parts of syria and the kurds do or don't get something. somebody, not russia, has to pour in the money to rebuild. this is where it starts to fall apart, but the russians do not have the money, resources or capacity to rebuild. not that we do either, and i'm sure the europeans do not as well. the russians should at least have the money. heather: sort of that strategic

eastern mediterranean area. how concerned are you that russia's approach to security policy is really eroding -- thats greece and turkey u.s. strategists were most worried about. back toike we are in a the future moment where turkey is being pulled into a different orbit. where do sanctions come in? kurt: first off, i think russia is taking advantage of openings or holes that have been allowed to open up. they don't fundamentally share a strategic perspective with turkey about syria. russia wants to keep a solid

impact -- assad in power and turkey wants to remove him. turkey is complaining about strategic issues in its neighborhood of not getting much engagement and the u.s. ends up arming kurdish groups that the turk -- that the turks feel are conducting terrorist attacks inside turkey. that drives a wedge and gives russia an opportunity, even though they don't have a fundamental strategic understanding with turkey to say we agree that these groups are bad, so we will work with you against those groups and that creates an opportunity to pull turkey in a given direction. ana situation where you have authoritarian russia that has place all of its bets on maintaining an authoritarian opted, where they have consistently to behave aggressively toward their neighbors, toward the west and the wider world, it is important

that there be a demonstration of resolve and push back on that. it is also important that we pull our side together. sharing a common set of values, wanting to build security and create stability. we've got to pull that together. i think you will find that we will have cases where we have disagreements with our friends and our allies. we don't share the same goal, but we've got to think more broadly that the first thing we have to decide is whether we want our community to be together or divided. if we want to pull everybody together, start there and continue to work on our differences. we thought the opposite direction over the past two years, of criticizing our friends and allies while seeking to negotiate with russia and in practice, driving people away. heather: would you say we are unified with the eu on ukraine?

kurt: absolutely. on ukraine, it is one of the areas where we have been most consistently coordinated. we have had multiple meetings that walk through what we think the problem is, what we think the responses are, the possible solutions, starting with france and germany. thers that are part of , other countries deeply involved like sweden and canada and then the eu as a whole and nato as a whole and also together with the ukrainians. this comes down to russia's hands. do they want to end this conflict or keep it going. heather: one of the areas of sanctions is election

interference. that is one area where we have not been consistent with the europeans. there were russian interference in the french elections but there were no french sanctions. do you think the kremlin consequences of its interference in 2016 as we believe there will be interference in the midterm elections and in 2022? olga: i think the russians are trying to decide what the lessons of their intro -- of their election interference are. i don't think they expected the effects they got in the u.s.. i don't think they know and we don't know exactly what those effects were. what we do know is the anger that they roused in america, and i think they understand that as generally a negative.

if they believe they were able to affect the american election, that would be a positive. if they believe they can have an impact in western european domestic politics, that is beyond their wildest dreams. most russianssons do not believe there is anything there to this is it is hard to imagine anything they russian government can do could threaten long-standing democracies. in thein the kremlin, theyhink limited vid this, will want to figure out which aspects of it worked and maybe more.on those a little think they are in the process of doing that cost-benefit

analysis. sanctions are an indicator of discontent. it is not as though you can usefully say stop interfering with my domestic politics and i will lift sanctions because it is one thing to watch credit and every time we discover evidence of past interference that we were not aware of the four, there is a call for more sanctions, which makes people angrier. the logic for those sanctions like the logic for some of the other policy choices, you put pressure on individuals. you put pressure on members of the government, on firms and as a result of that, they will put pressure on the government to change policy. i don't think it works that way, because especially now when you promises made to individuals who were sanctioned , i don'tombine that

think it was as well thought out .s it was the former spy almost dying in england and russian oligarchs who get put on a sanctions list being promised support. clear message of if you are with us, we will help you and if you are not with us, well, we will see what happens with you. russians are going to be scared enough of american sanctions to buck the government. they are much more scared of the russian government. i know you have heard from europeans as i have. thatwere in a laboratory we did not take seriously. that then took to the american

shores. kurt: i would think differently about russia's goals. i don't think russia is trying to achieve a particular electoral outcome. i don't think they had any impact in a particular way on the election outcome here or in france or elsewhere. i think the elections went the way they were going to go. sew they do try to do is deep uncertainty and discredit institutions. i would look at how that played out in the u.s. as successful. they've got everybody fighting each other. the issue of responding to russia's interference in the is largely about domestic politics in the u.s. and very little to do with russia. that is exactly what russia would want. this has become a domestic squabble because it did -- it discredited institutions and

that is what they will continue to try to do. they will continue to do it in other countries and presumably also in the u.s. midterm elections. the question is how do you deter that? i am not sure you can deter that behavior. i think the way that you deal with it is through transparency so that as long as people are aware, this is what russia is doing, it significantly diminishes the impact of russia doing it. heather: i agree, but i would call that deterrence. there is deterrence by the nile and by punishment. by the nile is if they waste their time. -- by denial is if they waste their time. if they want to charge that windmill to their heart content without having an impact, in

principle, they should decide to stop because it is a waste of time and resources. i also think that it is worth having -- this has raised all sorts of interesting and useful questions about how our democracies work, how political campaigns are financed, all of russia, it isout about anybody who chooses -- it is smart for us to get better at protecting ourselves, regardless of whom i tried to exploit us in the future. the invasion of georgia in 2008 with no response, years later we had crimea and there was a big response. you had the poisoning in 2006 and no response. you had this, a big response. probe, the west does

not respond. another probe and sometimes a think there is a bigger response because the first response was missed and we are playing a bit of ketchup -- a bit of catch up. my last question before i unleash our audience is arms control and inf violations. talking about sanctions and foreign-policy behavior, where are we on the arms control suite of issues? we have had long-standing inf violations with review display of new weapons. questioning whether president trump was considering imposing a new start.

what impact do we have or not? no sanctions for these violations so far. olga: i don't know that sanctions are the right response to inf violations. i think working out how to get back into compliance is the right response and i don't think sanctions are the way to do it. i do think in the united states, there is a limited appetite for traditional arms control and in russia there is a debate. some of that does fall under a new start, others could. said that he had no -- he brought up a

new start on extensions with -- in his first conversation with donald trump. could is that it constrain their own defense industry. united states ought to be interested in arms control cousin constrains the russians and gives transportation -- transparency and verification abilities where we don't have it without it. i do worry that the overall downturn in relations and overall distrust and the inf treaty violations are part of this may scuttle the future of arms control which would be dangerous for all of us. i think the russian tendency is to respond to inactivation with a counter accusation. you say they are violating and inf treaty and they say i know you are but what am i. they have identified some things that could be technical at -- technical violations.

you could sit down at the table and think of ways to update the inf treaty which has its detractors in washington and moscow. there are a lot of people who think that treaty is bad for both countries. that could lay the ground work for more arms control but right now, it is hard to be optimistic. you were working part of the a administration trying to get russia back in the transparency and confidence building measures. what is your take on strategic stability in the 21st century? what are the dynamics and how do you get russia there without punishment? works whencontrol you have a perception that there is going to be arms buildups and

people don't want it. it is an alternative, setting limits and controlling arms instead of getting into a arms race. if there is a perception that the u.s. is moving ahead with major imf deployments across europe, that would create an incentive in russia to want to have arms control. that is not going to happen. heather: that would divide europe. kurt: it would. it is not going to happen and russian knows it is not. for russia to be serious about -- strategically, that is potential different because there is a unilateral u.s. decision about inf arms control. russia has already done a lot of modernization. if we go forward with those plans and they create something

of an incentive for russia to get back to a strategic arms control framework. in the case of conventional arms, we have a situation that is almost unique. in the late 80's and 90's, we had these massive stockpiles of conventional weapons that no one could imagine a use for and they were expensive to maintain. there was desire on both sides to reduce our numbers. the numbers we reduced to our extraordinarily high by today's standards -- reduced to are extraordinarily high by today's standards. we could not put together a 10th of that right now. there was a massive reduction at the time that led to further reductions beyond that. i don't see any appetite on russia's part for conventional arms control because it sees that there is not the appetite in the west for building

conventional arms. here we are, twisting our to spend 2% of gdp on defense. i will turn to my audience to give us some optimism that sanctions can change russian foreign-policy behavior. i have not done that in the last couple minutes. if you could raise your hand and ask your question. yes sir. recently, there was a meeting between the president of china and the prime minister of india. according to an indian newspaper, worries of a new cold war between russia and the u.s. have often necessitated a new --erstanding between delhi

and beijing. have closer relations now between russia and china. there was a saying from the american revolution, if we don't hang together, we will hang separately. could we be pushing an alignment of russia and china and india together against us? i am not too worried about that just yet. i think they have enough things i certainlythem and am not opposed of them trying to and generally,r stabilization on the confident strikes me as a good thing. i think china is charting its own course and its own roads and what of that challenges u.s. interests are not remains to be clarified.

-- theythe russians are see real similarities in foreign-policy with china now but have concerns about china's development as well in the long-term and as russia becomes more activist in east asia, it is going to have more disagreements with the chinese. it is a very complicated equation and not quite as simple as everybody balancing against the united states. kurt: i would agree. i would put it in simple terms, i think there is a significant strategic rivalry between india and china, and i think china does not particularly take seriously. it sees russia as declining in power and population, not investing in the economy of its people, so less of a factor of the time.

china's real concern is the united states and our role in the pacific. i don't think those things really reflect what is behind people's thinking. heather: for me, it seems interesting that the growing ,hinese russian economic role in some way, sanctions had the unintended consequence of pushing russia to look for china's investment patterns, which has sort of changed but i agree that it is muted. it is not desired fully. we have seen energy growing. olga: russia sees a lot of economic future in asia ripped large. the relationship with china has been its path to that but russia wants its own path, it is not want to be following china.

european sanctions forced russia to look to china as an energy market and that is what is disappointing. i think the hope was that china was going to rescue them and then china drove a pretty hard bargain. this is a cautionary lesson for the russians and they had taken it as a cautionary lesson. asia is the future, but the chinese are not allies. they are strategic partners when they need to be. that's fine, that is how russia manages most of its relationships. it does not make up for the loss of european energy markets. see any conflict , economic division of labor down the road as it runs through central asia and getting into traditional markets? olga: russia hopes to gain economically.

the central asian deal on its surface is that the chinese will bring the money and the russians will bring security. it is not that clear that the russians will bring any security and the chinese do not trust that they will. the russians are concerned about encroaching chinese influence in central asia and the chinese are being careful not to overplay their hand in these countries because they've got the economy, they effectively have so much economic weight in central asia that if they wanted to, they could give the russians a real run for their influence. i don't know that they are interested in doing that at this stage of the game. they just want to get the trade ties up.

heather: -- how is that interaction happening between china and russia and countries that are either seeking integration or broader relationships with the west? the allowing of vacuums to crop up, a need for infrastructure investment in these countries, in past years, you would have seen the eu or the u.s. look at how to build a strategic engagement. at one time, the u.s. did have the policy of thinking east-west with everything from

energy to economy and even military supply routes, so there was an interest in that. much less so, now. china is able to make a decision and say we would be willing to make that investment. i don't think china in these cases is doing it with a geostrategic perspective in relationship to the united states or the west. i think it is doing it from a developmental perspective of china's own economic ties, trade ties, its ability to reach a wider and wider set of countries , which may not be bad for those countries and it is not necessarily bad if the infrastructure is there, if these countries stay on the course they have been on. it certainly has great promise.

they have done remarkably well coming out of the kosovo conflict and how they developed in their own country and what the prospects are with the next generation of the population looking toward integration in europe if we have the imagination to focus on the western walk. heather: i mentioned india. russian arms sales to india are mast -- are vast. olga: roughly 70% of india's -- heather: wow. that is historical. olga: russia inherited the arms sales with india from the soviet union. russia does not have the ties the soviet union had. india trying to be a -- build those ties but fell short. they are building in arms sales

relationship with pakistan which is small enough that it is not -- but it is a useful development to watch. an example of an opportunistic arctic -- policy. olga: would you like some helicopters? heather: do we have any other questions? >> i would like to emphasize or back up what was just said. i think it is more important for habitse changing our from east coast and west coast america and look across the pacific and look at what is happening with china and russia and now with korea and the one

country you have not mentioned is japan and the fact that japan and russia still do not have a peace treaty. should the situation chain and japan and russia become very close, and if you look at what is happening, china and russia are already very close, the packages across siberia into russia, moscow on one side and beijing on the other, it is a lot closer and they sanctions mainly related to europe does not seem to affect russia at all because i think perhaps they are saying when things become tough, we have china and possibly japan in the long-term to depend on. i wonder if that prospective is not useful for the future.

>> i would like you to elaborate on the russia relations in the congo which is approximately the size of western europe and also where we find the bulk of these significant minerals. also, could you elaborate more if russia will take the western traditional route as far as la mumba or the chinese rep where they develop infrastructure or will they charge their own way? also, do you see congo

particularly turning into the next syria, and if so, what would the u.s. and their allies due to prevent this? >> i think we have one more in the back. right there. thank you. >> regarding the western balkans, we know russia exerts influences in serbia and greece. do we have any knowledge about the government to make pressure on those governments? u.s. pressure on serbia and others? greece.those such as >> [indiscernible] >> thank you.

three big questions. russia/japan relations and the russian policy in asia, any reflections on policy in africa, the congo, and then how to encourage european countries such as serbia and others to follow u.s. sanctions. i will start with you. >> in japan, i think this is a really interesting and valuable question to ask. if russia/japanese detente happens, it damages the russia relationship with china quickly. i think that's interesting. this is specifically what i talk about when i say if russia starts increasing its influence in the asia-pacific region, it finds itself not as simpatico

with china as it is when it follows their lead. resolving the conflict is a stumbling block, the japanese government has sought a better relationship with russia repeatedly and the russian governments have looked for ways to improve their relations with japan but nobody wants to give on that one. that keeps it from moving forward. if you get a breakthrough, then i think it changes the balance in the asia-pacific region. -- similar toica russia and latin america in that mostly military sales, energy ties, and has tried to build those without quite the same enthusiasm it shows in other parts of the world that certainly looks for opportunities. to admit that i have not

followed the congo situation closely. i will say it's unlikely to be the next syria because it's unlikely to get the sort of western attention that syria has gotten regardless of what happens there. i will live the bulk of the next question to you. off, i want to broaden the first question. i think where we get along is the assumption that we have to choose between europe and asia. i don't think we can afford to pivot, i think they are both important. we have to be able to see the whole thing at one time. russia is a factor and china is a factor. europe, even though it is not as dynamic in terms of growth and population growth as asia, it's has enormous trade

and wealth. it's an enormous opportunity that is beneficial to the united states so we have to do both. that's something we have not been good at articulating but i think that's where we have to go. that puts us in a position of alignment with japan and korea and the philippines and indonesia and even vietnam as well as with our allies in europe. i think that's the way we need to think about this conceptually. i don'ton the congo, see -- maybe i have not looked into it enough -- i don't see as much direct russian and gauge meant in the congo as you see chinese were russia elsewhere in north africa. not to say that cannot change. it's a vacuum that can be exploited. it'sis one where i think such a tragedy in the congo.

the toll on the population and the lack of opportunity, the lack of infrastructure, the lack of economy, it really creates for exploitation of resources but not much else and does not provide the kind of geopolitical influence that russia is usually looking for. a counter example is libya. we left libya msn russia immediately decided to see whether it can get a role in libya in order to have a place at the table. balkans, it's not really a balkans question, it's a sanctions question. the u.s. and the european union are fundamentally in agreement on the reason for a sanctions being in place, the type and the nature of those sanctions and the need to maintain those sanctions. sanctions are most effective when they are applied by most

people. if you have a sanctions regime with a lot of holes in it, it would not be effective. sanctions on south africa during apartheid was most effective. you want to have maximum coherence in your sanction policy. for eu members such as greece, it's an eu decision. the eu as a whole needs to decide what sanctions will be implemented and of a country within the eu does not follow eu policy, there are consequences for that cut three -- for that country within the iu. for countries that aspire to e.u. membership, they want to be aligned with eu policy. healthspring their country forward as a whole. i think it's a great incentive and it helps those countries and helps the sanctions regime itself. the message here is that unity helps strengthen sanctions and hopefully gives russia a chance and an opportunity to rethink its policy.

thank you both for joining us. before i let you applaud, i need everyone to remain seated, don't move. senator ben cardin is about to appear and i know you want to be here and welcome him but first, our gueststhanking for a great discussion. [applause] we are going to do a set change but again, don't move. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org]